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Abstract
Egyptian economic  history has been  influenced  by  the  identify two sets of products:  six products where tariff
import-substitution  industrialization  approach  to  cuts will not be politically costly, and six where it will be
development, dating back to Gamal Abdel Nasser's Pan-  politically  costly,  In both cases, lowering  tariffs will
Arabic  and socialist movement in  the 1950s. Two major  improve  resource  allocation and  efficiency  in the
waves of liberalization  have  marked the government's  industries involved.
efforts to rationalize  and modernize the economy-the  The prospects of a free trade  area with Europe should
Infitah (opening) promoted  by Anwar Sadat in the  also help reduce  tariffs in sectors where a high share of
1980s,  and further trade and privatization  efforts by  production  is exported or imported from Europe.  If
Hosni Mubarak in the 1990s. Nonetheless,  the extent of  products are  exported to Europe, the potential  free
trade liberalization  does not compare  well with similar  access to the European  market should more than
countries. Despite  a decade of liberalization,  the trade  compensate  for any tariff reductions in  the local market.
regime is characterized  by deliberate and gradual  On the other  hand, if products are heavily imported
reforms.  By 1999 these reforms had led to average  tariffs  from Europe, the preferential  access for European
close to 30  percent, with high dispersion  and escalation,  exporters will tend to significantly increase  their
well above  those in comparable  countries.  presence  in the Egyptian market.  This inr  turn will reduce
Dorsati and Olarreaga  provide a political  economy  the "protective"  aspect of external tariffs  in sectors with
analysis of the difficulties of liberalizing tariffs  in Egypt  large  import penetration  as competition  will be coming
in general,  and in its specific  industries. They present  the  from  Europe.
theoretical  and empirical  models and discuss the results.  The EU-Egypt  agreement includes a lengthy  (19 years)
The authors also explore  the potential  effects of the  structure  of tariff reduction.  This structure  will lead to
Euro-Med  agreement for Egypt.  increased effective  rates of protection  for the first eight
The political  economy analysis  of the Egyptian  tariff  years of its implementation,  added economic distortions,
structure identifies two sets of highly protected sectors.  and inefficient use of resources.  The Egyptian  authorities
Overprotected  industries are  defined as those with actual  may want to consider speeding up the Euro-Med
tariffs at least 25 percent higher than what is predicted  schedule  of liberalization  to mitigate  an increase in
by the political  economy variables.  The political  effective  rates of protection.  Furthermore,  special  effort
determinants can be divided into two groups:  the  should be made to reduce  external  tariffs on semi-
lobbying and counter-lobbying  forces. First, the lobbying  processed and processed goods to attenuate the expected
strength of specific  capital  in each sector is proxied  by  negative effects  of the rise in effective  rates of protection.
the degree  of industry concentration,  the labor-capital  More generally, to prevent the high potential  for trade
ratio, and the import penetration  ratio. Second, counter-  diversion associated with Egypt's high  tariffs, a
lobbying in factor or input markets  is proxied  by wage  simultaneous  reduction in  Egypt's external tariffs  should
level,  degree of processing in the industry, and degree  of  accompany the EU-Egypt agreement.
intra-industry trade. Using this methodology,  the authors
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1Non-technical  summary of  " Politically Optimal Tariffs:  An application to Egypt"
By  Dorsati Madani (AFTP4), Marcelo Olarreaga (DECRG)
Egyptian economic history has been influenced by the import-substitution
industrialization approach to development, dating back to Gamal Abdel Nasser's Pan-
Arabic and socialist movement of the  1950s.  Two major waves of liberalizations have
marked the government's  efforts to rationalize and modernize the economy - the Infitah
(opening) promoted by Anwar Sadat in the 1980s and further trade and privatization
efforts by Hosni Mubarak in the 1990s.  Nonetheless,  the extent of the trade
liberalization does not compare well with similar countries.  Despite a decade of
liberalization,  the trade regime is characterized  by deliberate and gradual reforms.  By
1999, these reforms had led to average tariffs close to 30 percent,  with high dispersion
and escalation,  well above those in comparable  countries.
This paper provides a political economy analysis of the difficulties of liberalizing tariffs
in Egypt in general and in its specific industries.  The theoretical and empirical models
are presented and results are discussed.  We also explore the potential effects of the Euro-
Med agreement for Egypt.
The political economy  analysis of the Egyptian tariff structure allows for the
identification of two sets of highly protected  sectors.  Over-protected  industries are
defined as those with actual tariffs at least  25 percent higher than what is predicted  by
the political economy variables used in the analysis.  The political determinants we use
can be divided into two groups:  the lobbying and counter-lobbying forces.  First, the
lobbying strength of specific capital in each sector is proxied by the degree of industry
concentration,  the labor-capital ratio, and the import penetration ratio.  Second, counter-
lobbying in factor or input markets is proxied by wage level, degree of processing in the
industry, and degree of intra-industry trade.  Using this political economy methodology,
we identify two sets of products:  six products where tariff cuts will not be politically
2costly and six where it will be politically costly.  In both cases, lowering tariffs will
improve resource allocation and efficiency  in the industries  involved.
The prospects of a Free Trade Area (FTA) with Europe should also help reduce tariffs in
sectors where a high share of production is exported or imported from Europe. If
products are exported to Europe, the potential free access to the European market should
more than compensate  for any tariff reductions in the local market. On the other hand, if
products are heavily imported  from Europe, the preferential  access for European
exporters will tend to significantly increase their presence in the Egyptian market. This in
turn will reduce the "protective"  aspect of external tariffs in sectors  with large import
penetration as competition will be coming from Europe.
The EU-Egypt agreement includes  a lengthy (19 years) structure of tariff reduction.  This
structure will lead to increased effective rates of protection (ERPs) for the first eight
years of its implementation, added economic distortions and inefficient use of resources.
The Egyptian Authorities  may want to consider speeding up the Euro-Med schedule of
liberalization to mitigate an increase in effective rates of protection.  Furthermore,  special
effort should be made to reduce external tariffs on semi-processed  and processed goods
to attenuate the expected negative effects of the rise in effective rates of protection.
More generally, to prevent the high potential for trade diversion associated with Egypt's
high tariffs,  a simultaneous reduction in Egypt's external tariffs should accompany the
EU-Egypt agreement.
3Introduction
Egyptian economic history has been influenced by the import-substitution
industrialization approach to development, dating back to Jamal Abdel Nasser's Pan-
Arabic and socialist movement of the 1  950s.  Two major waves of liberalizations have
marked the government's efforts to rationalize  and modernize the economy  - the Infitah
(opening) promoted by Anwar Sadat in the 1980s and further trade and privatization
efforts by Hosni Mubarak in the 1  990s.  Nonetheless,  the trade liberalization  does not
compare well with similar countries.  Despite a decade of liberalization the trade regime
is characterized  by deliberate and gradual reforms that have led in 1999  to average tariffs
close to 30 percent,  with high dispersion and escalation - well above those in comparable
countries.
This paper provides a political economy analysis of the difficulties of liberalizing tariffs
in the general economy and in specific  industries.  After a brief overview of the Egyptian
past and present economic policy in section one,  we discuss the theoretical basis for our
analysis and present the empirical model and results in section two. Section three
identifies over-protected  and under-protected  industries, including an analysis as to
whether the EU-Egypt FTA agreement will help mitigate some of the resistance to
liberalization.  We discuss alternative liberalization scenarios in section four.  Section five
concludes.
4I.  Political  economy  of Egypt
A.  History in brief
Egyptian economic history is characterized  by import-substitution industrialization
approach to development,  dating back to Gamal Abdel Nasser's Pan-Arabic and socialist
movement of the 1950s.  Nasser gave a sense of populist entitlement to the people, while
allowing for a large public sector, a command economy and strong unions.  Anwar
Sadat's  Infitah (the opening) sought to roll back some of Nasser's legacy.  The Infitah
succeeded in fostering "a bourgeoisie thriving on international connections and tertiary
activities,  but it stimulated little investment in production industries or for export
(Hinnebusch,  1993, pg.  160)".
In the early  1990s, Hosni Mubarak undertook structural adjustment - assisted by the
IMF and World Bank - and went beyond the Infitah in an attempt to transform the
institutional structure of the economy.  In its economic rendition,  deepening the Infitah
was an attempt to integrate Egypt into the world market by unifying the exchange rate,
raising interest rates to internationally  competitive  levels, and ending the import
prohibitions and oil subsidies progressively.  Trade liberalization would help free the
local market from public sector dominance and partially correct economic incentives  for
production and exports.
The Egyptian bourgeoisie was ambivalent over the trade reforms.  Private industrialists
who benefited from privileged connections (trade monopolies, domestic market
domination)  with the public sector opposed reforms.  Import agents and businessmen
with an eye on public assets to be privatized supported them (Hinnebusch,  1993).
Lengthy debates between the government,  public manufactures,  and the private sector
contributed  to a slow pace of reform.  Furthermore, the government, still wanted to
achieve  promotion of production and export of semi-finished products by providing
domestic machinery and intermediate  goods. This policy duality slowed the pace of
liberalization (Weiss & Wurzel,  1998).
5Trade and stabilization policies launched in 1991  did not bring about the expected output
response.  While the economy was stabilized,  growth remained sluggish. Majd (1995)
notes that this may be due to a number of elements.  In addition to macroeconomic
stability, political stability and adequate institutional and infrastructural supports enhance
trade reform credibility.  Also, empirical evidence from developing countries suggests
that governments need to ensure that market contestability is not affected by potential
rent seeking, lobbying or vested interests.
B. As things stand
Springborg (1999)  argues that Egypt's economy still has the remnants of its economic
history.  One interpretation is that some political and economic elites may have sought to
keep their advantages by resisting reforms.  This type of behavior may be revealed in
their attempt at perpetuating tariff barriers to protect monopolized domestic markets  or
their lobbying efforts for over-valued currency in order to ensure continued access to
cheap imports. i
Springborg's analysis seems to be supported by the developments of the last decade in
trade. The Egyptian foreign trade trends are characterized by a heavy reliance  on rentier,
as opposed to productive, income.  For instance, in 1998 rentier income totaled US $10-
11  B, consisting of tolls on the  Suez Canal (US $2 B); tourism (US$  3 B); workers'
remittances (US $ 2.5 B); foreign aid (US $1  B); and petroleum  (US $1.5 B).  In the same
year non-oil commodity exports earnings summed up to some US $3B, equally divided
between primary products and manufacturing2.
' Springborg,  1999, pg. 27
2  Information from Berger and Checchi consulting  companies, January 2000, '"Trade and Investment
Trends and Prospects in Egypt".  Report prepared for USAID.
6B.1.  Tariff  Analysis
Egypt's trade liberalization has led to more than 50 percent decrease in tariffs.  However,
the trade regime still does not compare well with many countries that have undertaken
sweeping trade reforms.  Egypt's tariff regime  is characterized  by a high average tariff,
an extremely high dispersion of tariff levels across tariff lines, and a significant amount
of tariff escalation.  In 1999, Egypt's nominal average tariff rates  was 27.4 percent,
including the 3-4 percent customs and other surcharge3. While generally comparable  to
the Moroccan and Tunisian average tariff rates (respectively 25 and 33.6 percent), the
Egyptian rate largely surpasses that of Argentina (13.5 percent in 1998) and Chile (11
percent).  It also compares poorly to the  14 percent average of all IMF members.  Egypt's
average import-weighted tariff is  13.8 percent, comparable to Argentina's (  12.9%) but
higher than Chile's  (10.9%),  Malaysia's  (9.4 %)  and Philippines'(9.3%).  These
differences points to the relatively  restrictive  tariff structure in Egypt(see  appendix A).
Table 1:  Average nominal and import-weighted  tariffs for selected  countries
COUNTRY  1998 AVERAGE NOMINAL  1998 IMPORT-WEIGHTED  AVERAGE TARIFF
TARIFF (PERCENT)  (PERCENT)
Argentina  13.5  12.9
Brasil  14.6  16.6
Chile  11.0  10.9
Colombia  11.7  10.6
Egypt  27.4  13.8
Korea  7.9
Malaysia (1997)  8.7  9.4
Mexico  13:3
Morroco  25.0  11 .9g
Philippines  11.2  9.3
Tunisia (1997)  33.6
Venezuela  12.0  10.9
a Excludes  15 percent  surcharge applied to most imports.
3Egypt  high average nominal  level is partly influenced by the excessive tariffs in alcoholic beverages,
where tariffs can reach levels as high as 2600 percent (well above the 40 percent upper bound of the tariff
7The standard deviation of Egyptian tariffs in 1999 is 127 percentage points, which
indicates a high degree of dispersion in its tariff structure (the coefficient of variation is
equal to 4.5 compared to the traditional  0.5 level).4 The most salient feature of Egypt's
tariff structure is the degree of tariff escalation, i.e., tariffs are higher for fully-processed
products than raw materials or semi-processed products.  In  1999, the average tariff on
products in the first stage of processing was 14.3 percent;  in the second stage 21.4
percent and in the third stage 35.6 percent5. Tariff escalation can be found across all
Egyptian industries, with the exception of Fabricated Metal and Machinery  (see Figure 3
in Appendix A).  While not particular to specific industries, tariff escalation is rather
significant in Textile and Leather, Wood and Wooden Furniture and Basic Metal.  Given
the discussion above, it is not surprising that most distorting tariffs (Table 2) are found in
the manufacturing sectors, where the tariff range is between 0-3000 (0-135 excluding
alcoholic  beverages).
Table 2:  Applied MFN tariff, 1999
Per cent of all  verage  Average  including
lines  service  fee  and  R
(6,032)  (Per cent)  surcharge'  (Per cent)
Total  100.0  27.4  30.4  0-3,000
-agriculture and fisheries  5.2  17.9  20.9  1-40
-mining  1 9  11.0  14.0  3-40
- manufacturing  93.0  28.9  31 9  0-3,000
Total (excluding  tobacco and  100.0  21.5  24.5  0-135
alcoholic  beverages)
- agriculture and fisheries  5.2  17.9  20.9  140
-mining  1.9  11.0  14.0  3-40
-manufacturing  93.0  21.8  24.8  0-135
A 3 percent surcharge  is added across the board.  Source: Applied  1999 tariffs were provided by the Egyptian authorities.
schedule).  However excluding alcoholic  beverages, the average tariff remains at a high of 21.5 percent.
Including the 2-3 percent surcharge,  the average tariff is close to 25 percent.
4 Again, this is partly influenced by the tariff peaks  for alcoholic beverages;  but as shown in Table 4, there
are several other sectors where the within sector coefficient of variation is above the traditional 0.5 level.
The classification of different siages of production  was calculated according to WTO  filter used in Trade
Policy Reviews.
8II.  Political  economy  of tariffs:  determining politically  optimal tariffs
High tariffs appear consistent with the political economy equilibrium  in Egypt. To assess
the "political" cost that tariff reductions may induce, one first needs to understand what
determines the Egyptian tariff structure.  We follow the empirical literature on
endogenous tariff formation through industry lobbying.
The theory of endogenous protection describes how a combination of agents'.preferences
over trade policy and the weight given to different groups' preferences  may translate into
deviations from first-best trade policies.  Here we  briefly summarize the main results of
the theoretical and empirical literature6. We then use this framnework to identify sectors in
which tariffs  are above their political optimum, which in turn indicates that tariff
reductions should not be costly7.
General predictions
The predictions of the correlates of expected cross-sectoral  variations in tariff protection
are presented below. Other things equal, the level of protection  received by an industry
is higher8:
*  the higher the level of industry concentration.9 This captures free-riding  incentives a la
Olson.
6 For a recent review of the empirical  and theoretical  literature,  see Rodrik (1995). For recent empirical
literature applied to the region see Rama (1994). For alternative approaches  to the theory of endogenous
protection, based on "social insurance"  for example,  see Hillman (1989).
Due to data constraint, the analysis focuses on manufacturing exclusively.
8 All these results are also well documented in the empirical literature on endogenous tariff formation, see
Rodrik (1995). However, both the theoretical  and empirical results are somewhat partial equilibrium,  since
they do not necessarily account for the simultaneity bias. For an empirical study that accounts for the
simultaneity bias between  imports and tariffs,  see Trefler (1993). This aspect is rieglected  in the empirical
section.
9see Rodrik,  1987 for a theoretical justification and Trefler,  1993 or Marvel and Ray,  1983 for empirical
examples. Note that there is both empirical and theoretical evidence that this need not be the case. On one
hand, industry concentration allows to solve the free-riding problem. On the other hand, an increase in
group size may result in higher group contributions  (see Comes and Sandler,  1996).  Moreover, the theory is
9*  the lower the import  penetration  ratio. 10 The rationale for this is that the lower the
import penetration ratio, the lower the relative weight of consumers compared to
producers  in the government's objective function."I
*  the higher the degree ofprocessing  of the product' 2 . Here we capture lobbying
rivalry.  If sectorj purchases goods from sector i then sectorj will counter-lobby any
increase in sector  i's level of protection.  Thus, the higher the share of sector i
production that is purchased by other sectors the smaller the endogenous tariff.
Therefore, as long as consumers are not organized, consumer goods receive ceteris
paribus  higher levels of protection than intermediate goods.
*  the higher the labor/capital  ratio" 3. Cadot et al.  (1997) show that tariffs are higher in
sectors where the share of capital remuneration in value added is large, after
introducing lobbying rivalry on the labor market. A higher labor/capital ratio ceteris
paribus  has two opposing effects on the share of capital remuneration  in value added.
On one hand, the direct effect tends to reduce it, as a higher labor/capital ratio
obviously implies a smaller capital/labor  ratio. On the other hand, a higher
labor/capital ratio implies a higher marginal productivity of capital relatively to labor
which in turn raises the share of capital remuneration in value added. Under suitably
general  conditions, it can then be shown that the latter effect dominates the former if
not well-founded  in empirical measures of industry concentration as shown by Hillman (1991)  and Long
and Soubeyran (1996). For ambiguous evidence on the relation between protection and industry
concentration see Baldwin (1984). For a review of the literature on seller concentration  and protection,  see
Bilal (1995).  However,  there is a general presumption that industry concentration  leads to higher levels  of
protection and this is confirmed in the empirical  section.
0 see Grossman and Helpman,  1994 for a theoretical justification.  This result has been generally
challenged  on empirical grounds, as discussed by Rodrik (1995). For empirical examples, see Andersuii
(1980) or Finger and Harrison (1994).
" To see this, note that m/y = (c - y) / y = c / y - I where  m are imports (or net imports), c is consumption
and y the level of production.
12 see Cadot et al.,  1997 for a theoretical justification and Ray,  1991 or Marvel and Ray,  1983 for empirical
examples.
13  for empirical evidence,  see e.g., Finger and Harrison,  1994 and Rodrik,  1995
10the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is smaller than 1 (which is a
generally accepted value in the empirical literature).'4
*  the smaller the share of intra-industry  trade'5. Cadot et al. (1997)  argue that the larger
the share of intra-industry trade in total trade, the larger the elasticity of import
demand for goods produced in the domestic economy, and thus following Ramsey
pricing rule, the lower the tariff (since the efficiency costs of a tariff is relatively large
compared to the producers gain in that case).  Marvel and Ray (1987) suggest an
alternative explanation based on intermediate inputs counter-lobbying:  they argue that
intra-industry trade essentially arises among producers (purchase of intermediate
goods), and as producers are more concentrated than consumers,  they tend to be more
efficient in combating protectionist pressures. Finally, Levy (1997) argues that an
increase in intra-industry  trade benefits all agents whereas  an increase in inter-industry
trade has the usual Stolper-Samuelson redistributive  effects and therefore  are subject
to more conflict and higher lobbying pressures.
If one assumes that labor markets are segmented in the sense that labor is better
conceived as being mobile across a particular  group of industries rather than across the
economy as a whole, then it can be shown that the level of protection  received by an
industry is higher:
*  the lower the equilibrium wage in this sector 16.  Cadot et al.  (1997) show that the
optimal endogenous tariff of each sector is positively related to the share of specific
capital in total sales. Then, the larger the wage in sector I (once we control for output
14  In a two factor sector, the share of capital remuneration  in value added is given by:
pJ  = rk/[we + rk] = 1/[we/rk + 1],  where r is capital wage, k is  the amount of capital, w is labor wage and
e is the amount of labor. Then  al/(elk)  = 1/[wel(rk) + I]2 w/r(l + a) where  a  is the elasticity of
substitution between labor and capital.  And the right hand side is larger than zero if Jul < 1 .Note that the
empirical estimation of the elasticities of substitution between labor and capital generally yield values
below one.
15  for theoretical  explanations see Cadot et al.,  1997, Levy,  1997 and Marvel and Ray,  1987; for an
empirical-example,  see Marvel  and Ray, 1987.and labor/capital ratios), the smaller the share of capital  in total sales, and therefore  the
smaller the incentives to lobby in the political game.
Empirical specification
The Egyptian tariff equation is given by:
log Ti = ao +  klog PVi,k + Pi
where subscript i refers to the 81 industry aggregation of the ISIC-4 digit manufacturing
classification;  T 1 is tariff in sector i, a s are parameters,  PVi,k  is the political economy
variable k in sector i,  pL,  is the error term. The political-economy variables were listed
above. The construction and expected signs of these variables are given in the annex.
We face a potential heteroscedasticity problem as we use grouped data where the number
of elements per line differ from 1 line to 524 ( see table 3).  This is due to the fact that
tariffs are generally set at the tariff line level (8-digit of the HS system) and that the
political-economy  analysis is carried out at the industry level.  To correct this potential
heteroscedasticity we weight each observation by the square root of the number of tariff
lines in each industry (Dickens,  1990).  The estimation method is OLS with a White
correction to obtain robust standard  errors.
Estimation results for the above equation for Egypt's manufacturing  sector are reported in
the table 3 below.  The overall fit of the equation is relatively good and variables tend to
have the expected sign except for intra-industry trade and labor-capital ratio. The reason
for this is probably due to the fact that Egypt tariff structure tends to highly protect
capital intensive  sectors.
16 see Cadot et al.,  1997 for a theoretical justification and Anderson and Ray,  1987 and Ray,  1991  for
empirical examples.
12Table 3: Determining Egypt's tariff'
4-digit ISIC




Degree of processing  .22
(0.28)
Intra-industry trade  .19**
(.06)
Capital Owners Lobbying
Labour-capital ratio  -0.04*
(0.02)
Industry concentration  0.10*
(0.05)





number of obs.  81
'Estimation  is done using OLS.  Figures in parenthesis are White robust standard  errors. **  denotes significance at the  I
percent  level; *  at the 5  percent  level.
III.  Identification of over-protected  and under-protected industries
The political-economy  analysis also allows us to identify over-protected  and under-
protected industries.  The Indicator of over-protection (I,) determined by the ratio of the
actual tariff level (ti) the fitted value (i,) from the above estimation: 17
7 More correctly, the exponential of the fitted value.
13ti
If the ratio is larger than 1 then this indicates that the sector has a higher tariff level than
what would have been predicted from the above estimation.18
We identify over-protected  industries is those where the value of the actual tariff is 25
percent higher than the value predicted by the political economy variables described.  This
corresponds to all industries for which the Indicator in the third column of table 3 is
above  1.25. This is the case for 27 of the 81 sectors (or 33 percent of all sectors) of the
ISIC 4-digit manufacturing classification.
The top six over-protected  industries (excluding Alcoholic beverages)  are: Motor
Vehicles (3843), Soft drinks (3134), Tobacco (3140), Musical Instruments  (3902), Tyres
and Tubes (3551)  and Electrical  appliances  and housewares  (3833). These are all
industries where the average tariff is above 30 percent.  Given that they tend to be
relatively over-protected,  as suggested by the political economy variables, tariff
reductions  should not be politically  costly. 9 Moreover,  all these sectors consist of fully-
processed products (and some semi-processed in Motor vehicles), which implies that
tariff reductions will also reduce the extent of tariff escalation in Egypt's tariff structure
(see Table 4), contributing to efficiency gains due to resource  reallocation.
With the exception of Tyres and Tubes, these over-protected  sectors are not involved in
export activities20 (see Table 4). The high levels of protection are distorting the allocation
of resources to these activities in which Egypt has apparently  a low comparative
advantage. Reallocating resources  from these sectors to the rest of the economy by
lowering tariffs  in these over-protected sectors should therefore, not only have a low
political cost, but also provide a boost on exports of products in which Egypt has a
comparative advantage.
18 Other political-economy  variables,  such as the share of public ownership  were excluded  of the analysis,
but could be introduced  if data was available  at the industry level.
'9  This statement relies on the assumption that non crucial political economy variable  for any of these
sectors  has been  ignored.
14A.  Where will the tariff  reform hurt?
The political-economy analysis also allows us to identify industries where tariffs are
close to or below their political optimum. We define these industries as those where the
tariff fitted value obtained (see appendix)  is not larger than the actual applied tariff (i.e.,
the indicator in the first column of Table 4 is smaller than 1).
The more under-protected  sectors  (i.e., those for which the indicator in Table 4 has the
lowest values) are Grain mill products (3116), Agriculture machinery and equipment
(3822), Railroad equipment (3842), Engines and Turbines (3821)  and Aircraft (3845).
These  are all sectors  in which the applied  average tariff is below  10 percent and therefore
should not be affected by a tariff reduction that reduces the highest tariffs.
However, there are eight sectors that have applied average tariffs above 30 percent and
for which the value of the political indicator in Table 4 is below 1. These are: Bakery
products (3117), Cocoa,  chocolate and sugar confectionery (3119), Knitting mills (3213),
Leather products (3233), Footwear (3240), Wooden and cane containers (3312),  Soap,
cleaning preparations, perfumes (3523), Pottery, china, earthenware  (3610). These are
sectors in which tariff reduction will be politically costly and where a longer adjustment
period may be necessary.  Note that all these sectors consist of fully-processed products
with the exception of Cocoa, chocolate  and sugar confectionery which also includes
semi-processed products  (see Table 5).
However, two of these sectors export a significant amount of their domestic production
(Leather,  81  percent and Pottery 67 percent). Tariff reductions in these sectors will
probably lead to within industry reallocation of resources from inefficient producers that
sell within the domestic market to more efficient producers that aim towards foreign
markets.  Given that within industry reallocation  implies relatively low adjustment costs,
the adjustment period for these sectors  could be shorter.
20 where  15 percent of domestic production  is exported.  Also see table 5.
15The remaining six sectors show little export activities (with the exception perhaps of
Wooden and Cane containers).  Reducing tariffs in these sectors (in the medium run to
allow for costly adjustment) will lead to reallocation of resources into more efficient
sectors with a more outward oriented production structure.
B.  Can the EU-Med agreement  help ease the pain?
B.1  The EU-Egypt  Agreement  - General  Description
The full EU-Egypt agreement was not available for a review at the time of this analysis,
but available information suggests that it emulates the recent Tunisia and Morocco
agreements in tariff reduction schedule and preferential  access.2'  The new EU-Egypt
agreement is to achieve a free trade area by 2010.  It will ensure a deepening of the trade
liberalization beyond Egypt's Uruguay Round commitments, albeit on a preferential
basis.  It will also provide improved market access for Egyptian exporters to its largest
trade partner.
The agreement will provide preferential  access to the EU market for most Egyptian
industrial exports (these later constitute 60% of the Egyptian exports to the EU).  The EU
may provide duty free access to some industrial exports while duties on EU exports of
most industrial products to Egypt are expected to be phased out over  12 years.
21  Both Tunisia's and Morocco's EU agreement only covers industrial products21. Tunisia already has
free access  for most of its industrial exports to the EU since a  1976 agreement - except for textile in which
it  has not filled its quota anyway.
The Tunisian agreement opens up, over 12 years,  all tariffs and non-tariff barriers  to industrial
imports from EU,  subject to a measure of safeguard.  QRs and tariffs were immediately removed for
intermediate inputs and capital goods (equipment goods).  There is a delayed  liberalization of the consumer
goods imports.  This has caused increased ERP, leading to further distortions  in the economy.  In light of
this development,  The IMF has suggested advancing the remaining phases of trade tariff dismantling.  This
is to avert any further mis-allocation of resources that later would need to be re-deployed at economic and
political cost.
The first phase of trade liberalization  (tariff reduction)  in line with the EU-Moroccan  agreement
went into effect on July  1, 1999.  This first stage,  as in the Tunisian case,  involves reducing tariffs on
industrial and intermediate goods.  Tariffs will be eliminated  on raw material and capital  goods within the
first 5 years of the implementation  of the agreement.  This liberalization  pattern  will imply an increase in
effective protection at first.
16Tariff concessions on a seasonal basis are accorded on some agricultural products,  based
on reference prices and quotas.  The concessions range-between  40-80 percent of the EU
CET for mainly complementary products to EU agricultural production:  dates, mangoes,
onions, potatoes, citrus fruits. The agreement is non-reciprocal.  EU exports  face MFN
tariffs.
The schedule of tariff reductions is launched three years after the agreement goes into
effect.  It will take 20 years after signature to be fully implemented.  The tariff reduction
schedule, especially as it applies to industrial products,  is geared to remove tariff on raw
and intermediate inputs and capital goods, but delay liberalization of consumer goods
imports.
More specifically,  the schedule of tariff reduction consists of three  broad lists:
(i) agricultural  commodities, for which the two parties have agreed to quotas.
(ii) Ago-Processed  Products, which were not considered  as industrial  goods and for
which the EU currently apply tariffs.
(a)  Products presently subject to tariffs of 1-5 percent (i.e. bones, bird skin and
feather,  maltose, cocoa; etc.) will have face zero tariffs starting in the  first year the
agreement goes into effect.
(b)  Products presently subject to 20-30 percent tariffs (i.e. milk, vegetable
extracts, etc.) will see the maximum rates reduced by 15 percent to 22.5 percent from
year 3 and within 3 years.
(c ) Finally, products presently subject to 30-40 percent tariffs (i.e. biscuits, based
items, preserved vegetables and fruits, etc.), will see the maximum rates reduced by 25
percent to 30 percent from year 3 and within 3 years.
(ii) Industrial imports which are grouped into four categories:  primary, intermediate and
final (consumer)  goods, and a last category deals with cars only.
17(a)  Primary and industrial  commodities are currently subject to 5-20 percent
tariff.  Tariff reductions  will start after the initial three years of implementation and
tariffs will be eliminated  in four years (in 25 percent tranches), so that by the 7th year
these products will have -zero tariffs.
(b)  Intermediate commodities are currently  subject to  10-20 percent tariffs.
Tariff reductions will start on  the 7th year after the agreement is signed and will reach
zero percent in the 13th year.
(c)  Finished consumer goods liberalization will be launched in 1  oth year the
agreement's implementation  and tariffs will reach zero on the  19th year.
(d) Reductions in car tariffs will start on the 1Oth year of the agreement's
implementation and  tariffs will reach zero on the 19th year.
B.2  Implications of Egypt-EUAgreementfor  Egypt's External Tariffs
This agreement will have important consequences  for Egypt as the EU represents 42
percent of its export market and 39 percent of its imports.22 The EU-Egypt tariff
reduction schedule discussed above, similar to the Tunisian and Moroccan agreements, is
expected to increase the effective rates of protection, peaking during the eighth year after
signing of the agreement,  and then declining to zero by  the 19t  year.  This will lead to
inefficient  re-deployment of economic resources towards more protected final industries
in the medium term.  It may also make liberalization in the later years more politically
difficult for the Egyptian  government as some industries become  accustomed to higher
medirum term rates of effective  protection.
More worrisome,  given Egypt's existing  high tariff level, dispersion,  and escalation,  the
EU-Egypt agreement is expected to create trade diversion if not accompanied  by external
tariff liberalization.  Egyptian tariff will no longer protect Egyptian producers
exclusively, but also European exporters to the Egyptian market. This will induce income
redistribution from the government's tariff revenue to European  exporters. To avoid trade
22 The restrictiveness  of the EU rules of origin will play be an important factor for this to hold true.
18diversion,  trade liberalization with Europe should be accompanied by external tariff
reductions.2 3
Reductions of external tariffs will also enhance Egypt's export competitiveness  as it
decreases  the anti-export bias embedded in the high tariffs.  Duty-free access to the
European market should compensate Egyptian exporters to Europe for any domestic loss
of protection, especially in semi- and fully-processed  goods. In 23 of the 96 sectors
reported in table 4 exports to Europe represents more than 50 percent of total exports.
Note that in  16 of these  23 sectors the product degree of processing is above 2 which
indicates that these products are either semi- or fully- processed goods. These are also
products in which Egypt tends to have high tariffs.
Duty free access to the Egyptian market granted to European exporters will intensify
competition in Egypt as it reduces the level of "protection"  granted to Egyptian
importers.24 In 38 of the 96 sectors reported in table 4, European imports represent more
than 50 percent of total Egyptian imports.  More importantly, in 33 of these 38 sectors the
level of processing is above 2, which suggest that these goods are semi- or fully-
processed products. In Egypt these products tend to have high tariffs.
To a small country, an important attraction of Free Trade Areas (FTA) with large partners
is that its producers  are protected by the large partners' tariffs within the FTA zone.  If
the small country also lowers its extemal tariffs, its consumers  and users of imported
intermediate products can enjoy lower price products at home.  This logic is behind the
lowering of extemal tariffs in Chile while the govemment was multiplying its preferential
trade agreements with partners in the Westem Hemisphere  and beyond.
For the above reasons, the Euro-Med Agreement  should help Egypt commit to further
extemal trade liberalization.  Trade-diversion and increased competition in the domestic
23  See World Bank (2000), Trade blocs, Washington DC.
24 For an exposition of this argument see Martin Richardson (1993), "Endogenous protection and trade
diversion",  Journal of international economics 34, 309-324.
19market calls for lower tariffs, duty-free access to the European Union market should
make tariff reductions easier to introduce25.
Duty free access to the European market will make the reallocation of resources from
highly protected sectors into export oriented sectors less costly (as long as the agreement
accounts for Egypt's export interests and  rules of origin that are not too restrictive).  In
the two sectors (Leather  and Pottery), where tariff reductions may be politically costly,
but where there is a strong outward orientation, duty free access to the European market
will compensate  for any tariff reductions in the domestic market. This is especially true
for Pottery where almost 50 percent of domestic production is already exported to
Europe.
Increased competition from European exporters in Egypt's market in some products will
make any Egyptian external tariff irrelevant as European producers may flood the market
with their products under the agreement.  This is again true for Leather products where
imports from Europe represented 63 percent of local production in 1998 and for Pottery
where the corresponding figure is 35 percent.
IV.  Other Regional Agreements  and their Potential Impact
Traditionally,  trade has not been very large with regional partners,  though there are
potential medium term gains from improved access to regional markets.  Egypt has
started to respond to this opportunity and has  engaged in a multitude of regional and
bilateral agreements in the late 90s.  The two most notable regional  ones - aside from the
EU-Med - are Greater Arab Free-Trade Area (GAFTA)  and Common Market of the
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).
By joining COMESA and GAFTA, Egypt has committed itself to greater regional trade
liberalization.  GAFTA was signed in 1997 and aims to expand intra-regional trade by
25 The previous Minister of Industry in  Morocco, Hasan Abouyoub,  has mentioned that external trade
liberalization would not have been feasible  without first entering into a free trade agreement with the
20reducing customs duties by 10 percent annually starting in January  1998.  Seasonal
quotas on agricultural  exports will be applied until all tariffs are phased out. COMESA
was created i;n  1993. Egypt joined in June 1998.  COMESA's  goal is to have a common
external tariff (CET) by 2004, with  zero percent tariff for capital  goods, five for raw
material,  15  for intermediate  inputs and 30 for final goods.  Egypt will need to undertake
further liberalization to fit within this framework as its present tariff schedule shows
peaks beyond the proposed  CET, even after excluding "sensitive" products such as
beverages and motor vehicles.  There are opportunities for  Egyptian exporters, especially
to COMESA countries.
21.  The bevy of  bilateral agreements,  such as the one recently signed with a number
of Arab countries and the ones being negotiated with the US and Turkey will enhance
trade liberalization while raising concerns regarding  possible trade diversion and
increased complexity of the Egyptian trade regime (i.e., the "spaghetti-bowl"
phenomenon linked to overlapping regional trade agreements with different regimes
regarding rules of origin).
V.  Conclusions
The political economy analysis of the Egyptian tariff structure  allows the identification  of
two set of highly protected sectors:  those in which tariff reductions  are going to be
politically difficult (bakery products, cocoa, chocolate  and sugar confectionary,  knitting
mills, leather products,  footwear, wooden and cane containers,  soap, cleaning
preparations, perfumes, pottery,  china and earthenware ) and those in which tariff cuts
will not be politically costly ( motor vehicles,  soft drinks, tobacco, musical instruments,
tyres and tubes, electrical appliances and Alcoholic beverages).  The first group could be
given a longer adjustment period. For the second group, tariffs cuts could be more
speedy. In both cases tariff cuts would improve resource allocation and efficiency within
the industries.
European Union (see World Bank (2000), "Trade  blocs", Washington DC).
21The prospects of a Free Trade Area with Europe should also help reduce tariffs in sectors
where a high share of production is exported or imported from Europe. If products are
exported to Europe, the potential  free access to the European market should more than
compensate for any tariff reductions in the local market. On the other hand, if products
are heavily! imported from Europe, the preferential  access for European exporters will
tend to significantly increase their presence in the Egyptian market.  This in turn will
reduce the "protective"  aspect of external tariffs in these sectors due to the added
competition
The full implementation of the structure of tariff reductions embedded within the EU-
Egypt agreement will take  19 years.  This structure leads to increased effective rates of
protection for the first eight years of its implementation, added economic distortions  and
inefficient use of resources.  Egyptian Authorities may want to consider speeding up the
Euro-Med schedule of liberalization to mitigate this increase in effective rates of
protection.  Furthermore, special effort should be made to reduce external tariffs on
semi- and fully-processed goods to attenuate the expected negative effects of the rise in
effective rates of protection.
More generally, to prevent the high potential for trade diversion associated with Egypt's
high tariffs, a simultaneous reduction in the country's external tariffs should accompanied
the EU-Egypt agreement.  This will allow domestic producers to benefit from lower-
priced intermediate  inputs, originating from both European and non-European  sources.
This in turn will allow them to maximize their benefits from the duty free access to the
European market.  This type of rationale was behind recent demands by Chilean
producers to cut Chile's external tariffs from its uniform level of 11 percent to 6 percent.
22Table 4
Political  economy  of tariffs
ISIC  |Description  |Political  Average  %  of  %  of  %  of  %of  Export/  Import/
Rev. 2  Economy  tariff  Total  Total  Exports to  Imports  Output  Output
Indicator  Import  Export  EU  from EU
3111  Slaughtering,  pi-eparing &  preserving meat  1.585  26.592  0.025  0.003  0.343  0.644  0 041  2.4t3
3112  Dairy products  1.113  20.382  0.012  0.002  0.000  0.491  0.023  0.986
3iii3  Canning, preserving offruits and vegetables  1.137  33.885  0.001  0.022  0i434  0.489  0.264  0.084
3ii4  Canrning,  preserving and processing of fish  1.598  22.237  0.005  0.000  0.000  0.186  0.010  3.881
31i5  Vegetable  and animal oils and fats  0.660  10.444  0.053  0.004.  0.011  0.066  0.013  1.201
3116  Grain mill products  0.362  10.588  0.003  0.074  0.027  0.281i  0.125  0.035
3i i 7  iakery products  0.822  35.i i35  0.002  0.003  0.0i3  05
3118  Sugar factories  and refineries  1.105  16.833  0.016  0.006  0.417  0.345  0.015  0.281
3119  Cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery  0.971  33.846  0.001  0.002  0.015  0.572  0.024  0.044
3121  Other food products  0.978  27.353  0.004  0.004  0.027  0.673  0.018  0.136
3122  Prepared animal feeds  1.112  26.667  0.004  0.000  0.062  0.915  0.002  0.178
3i3i  Distiiiing rectifying  and blending spirits  3.030  600.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  0.000  0.000
3i32  Winre  industries  57.732  2229.286  0.000  0.000  0.729  0.703  0.008  0.028
3133  Malt iiquors and malt  10.254  420.000  0.000  0.000  0.020  1.000  0.010  0.000
3134  Soft drinks  and carbonated  waters  3239  40.00.0  .0  0.0i  0.0  0.272  0.013  0.0i0
3 iio  Tobacco  2---  59  47.389  0_0  _  ...  _.  0.081  0.0  0.000  0.138
3211  i  Spinning, weaving  and finishing textiles  '5.978  47.663  0.029  0.660  0.644  0 176  0.142  0.171
322  Made-up textiie  goods exci.  wearing apparel  1.128  37.500  0.001  0.048  0.727  0.437  1.731  0.337
32i3  knitting milis  0.922  54.000  0.000  0.002  0.257  0.394  0.030  0.024
32i4  Carpets and rugs  1.429  38.519  0.000  0.029  0.2i4  0 184  0.411  0.025
32  i  orda"ge, rope and twine  0.602  27.917  0.000  0.002  0.678  0.204  0.284  0.229
32i 9  Othertextiles  1.1i73  26.756  60.002  0.00 i  0.562  0.397  0.o  15  0.3 1  3
32_9  Othe  tetie  . ..  . ---.  . ....-.  - - - -.--  - - ---..-.---..-  --  - --.. 
3220  Wearing apparel,  except footwear  0.889  39.512  0.001  0.181  0.325  0.292  0.926  0.021
323i  Tanneries  and leather finishing  0.505  24.087  0.000  0.007  0.542  0.665  0.577  0.012
3232  Fur dressing and dyeing  industries  1.739  00.000  1.  0.000
3233  ieather prods. exi. Wearing apparel  0.927  30.367  0.001  0.002  0.155  0.347  0.814  1.823
3240  Footwear, except rubber orplastic  - 0.7i3  40.000  60.001  0-603  0.187  0.249  0.170  0.276
33ii  Sawmiiis, pianing and other wood  mills  1.268  21.373  0.054  0.001  0.098  0.502  0.017  7.508
33i2  Wooden and  cane containers  0.663  _33.000  0.000  0.000  0.632  0.44  0.130  0.201
3319  Other wood and cork  products  0.503  23.125  0.000  0.000.0.°i°  0.464  0.959  1.373
3320  Fumiture and fixtures, excl.  metal  1.143  39.783  0.002  0.007  0.288  0.644  0.154  0.233
34ii  Puip, paper, and paperboard articies  1.440  19.248  0.043  0.008  0.574  0.389  0.089  3.351
3412  Containers of paper  and paperboard  1.350  34.375  0.001  0.000  0.026  0.481  0.004  0.060
iSIC  Description.  Political  Average  %of  %of  %of  %of  Export!  Import/
Rev.  2  Economy  tariff  Total  Total  Exports to  Imports  Output  Output
|Indicator  Import  Export  EU  from EU
34ii  Other puip,  paper and  paperboardarticles  i.26i  -28.182  0.001  .00.  6.6  0.753  0.000  0.160
3420  Printing and publishing  |0.872  i9.890  0.002  0.007  0.086  ° 591  0.036  0.080
3j5i  5asic chemicals excl. fertilizers  0.893  11.031  0.048  10.036  0.479  0.557  10.208  1.893
35i2  Fertilizers and  pesticides  0.909  17.222  0.008  10.02ij4  Jj.3  6.ii3  1'.002  |0.2,4
35i3  Syntheticresinsandpiasticmateriais  |i.303  12.359  0.053  004i  6.4½2  0.389  0.422  33.800
3521  Paints,  varnishes and  lacquers  73  j25.000  0.003  .00i  0.073  0.690  j0009  0.255
. .- --,.......  --..-  --.  --  --  -t  --  - ........................ I  -1!..--  --.  T  - . 3-  --  02--0  .53-0 -0I  0---9
3522  Drugs and medicines  10.451  16.411  .029  10.039  0.025  10753  103  0519
233523  Soap, cleaning  preps.,  perfu.mes, cosmetics  0.878  30.760  0.005  10023  087  0.780  0.092  0. 126
3529  Oither chemical  pr~oduc,t-s  1.  122-  2-3.0-7-8  0.0-10-  0-.0-2-4,, 0.494  0.C690  0~.40-5  1.079
3530  Petr'oleu'm"re'finer-ies  0.549  15.71  0.002  0009  0.7 9-1  0.243  - 0005  0.006
354  Mfisc. petrol-eum- and coal  products  0.610  13.125  0.000  0.017  0.332  0.620  0.114  0.019
3551  Tyres  and tubes  2.127  30.000  0.005  0.005  0.328  0.283  0.148  0.952
3559  Otherrubbeir pro-du-cts  1.305  21.291  0.005  0.001  0.174  0.625  0.043  2.626 
-~6Fli-..poF-i------  ----  -----  -1.1-95-  -29.782-  0.00-9-  0O.0O15-  -0-.738  0-.4-70-  0-.08 6-  0.3  3-4
3j0i  Ptt~ery, dhina,.ert-nw.e0.09-10-  - 32.,679  ---- 0.0-03-  0-.01,5-  -0.7-17  0-.4-62-  -0.6-7-6  -075-7
3620  Glass and products  1.304  27.391  0.008  0.014  0.209  0.419  0.183  0.655
3691  Stiructural  c-lay-  pr-oduct's  .0-.-850  2-4.4-05  0.-OOJ3 0-.005-  0.104W  0.7-23  0. 0  6-2  -0-.23 5-
3692  Cement, lime and plaster  ..  .42  065  0.011  0.001  0.041  0.114  0.003  0.168
369  O)ther  non-metal-lic mi:neral  products"  0.82  -2  4.75 1  - 0. 0-  02  0.0-07  0-.'080-  0-.6-67  0.0-1-5  0-.0-3  3
3710  Iron and steel  0.946  15.906  0.097  -0.063  0.311  0.255  0.153  i 582
3720  Non-ferrous metals'  0.02  1.3 15  0.022  0.061(  0.85  0.285-  0. 223  0.433
j§Ti  1~ufiery,  hand toois' and  general  hardware-  101  i8.080  0.012  0.0-06  0.066  0.573  0.279  3.440--
3i2  furniture and fixtu're-s  pri-m-arily of-m-e-t-al  1.7-8-5  -3-6.6-67  -0.  0  0  0  0.0-00-  0.12-9  0-.6-63  0-.0-03  0-.0-6-4
3813  Structu"rali  me'talI pr'oducts  - 0.803  16.014  0.006  0.003  0.178  0.665  0.039  0.551
89 Other  fabricated metal products  099  2.7  .1  .1  .1  .7  .5  .7
jg2i  Engln-es -and-  t-u-rbin-es  0.389  7.083  0.002  0..000  0.000  0.332  0.004  0.846
3822  Agricuitur-al m  a'c-hiner-y  an-d-eq-uip`me'n-t  0.363  6.717  0.005  0.000  0 042  0.320  0.117  18.783
3823  Metal andwood workiin-gmac~hine-y'  0-.6-61  7-.79-6  0.-0-1-0 0-.001I  0.119-  0.6-2-9  0.3  5-4  17-.4 05
3824  Other special industrial machinery  ~  0-  0  6.796  0.086  0.003  0.093  0.595  0.060  12.780
3825  Offie,  computngandaccontingmachner  .11.957  11.875  0.0-i18  .000-  0.625  0.419  0.044  13.860
3829  Other non-el  ect-ricaI  -ma'c-hinery and equipment  0.973  15.419  0.0-73  0.003  0.  1-68  0-.642  0.008  1.286  -
383i  El-e-ctrical  indu'stri'al1  m-a-chin-e-ry ---- 0.982  13.767  0.027  06.001i  0.33 1  0.3543  0.0610  o  1.2-6-4
3832  Radio, televisio-n anid  c-ommunnication equipt.-  -1.54-0  -16-.  7  9  3  0-.0'4-4  O.  0-01  0-.2-32  0-.  5-2  1  0-.  009  3.698
3n  Eiectrl~~  appii an'ces anrid  hou-s'ewares  1.89 1  38.420  0.003  0.000  0.272  0.391  0.007  0.376
Othe  i5r  ~electric-al  a'p-pa-ratus  -and  sup-pl'ies  1.458  23.605  0.016  0.001  0.273  0.564  0.010  0.733
ipiuil  ing  and repairing  0.2  14.635  0.003  0.001  Ojil1  0.826  0.013  0.341
3842  Railroad -e-quipm  en't  . 0.384  6.591  05.0  0-1  0-.0O00  05.5-  -19  0.615  0.0  .9
384  Motor vehicles.3.767  56.571  0.054  0.001  0.426  0.423  0.004  0.961
g4 moorcycleia-,d b-icyciles  -1.4-3 1  -21.2  8-8  -0.00-3  0-.0-00-  0.0-3-4  0.14-3  -0.0-0-1  -0.93  8-
3845  Aircraft  0.389  -. 5.000  0.000  0.0  .00  .1
3849  Other  transportation equipment  0.888  - 20:000  0.  000  1.000  1.00  0.093  0.000  2.969
3851  -Prof.  Andscientiic eq-uipment'n.e.c.  0.3b.8  .2  .00C3  0.180  0.574  0.18  8.25§
382  Photoglraphic  an-d  opt-ic-al  go-o-ds-  1.-239  1.3  0-.00-4-  0-.000  -0.-764-  0.4-  27  0-.0-15  4.917
383 Watches and  clocks  0.948  19.615  0.002  0.000  0.333  0.074  0.002  65.231
90  Jeelr  and reae  rils041  23.333  0.000  0.000  0.156  0.258  0.101  0.083
3902  Muales  T;  nstru-men-ts  -2.485  30.000  0.000  0.000  0.185  0.361
j  be-scription  Po.litical  Average  %  of~ %j  of  %  of  %  of  Export/  Import/
Rv2  Economy  tariff  Total  Total  Exports to  Imports  Output  Output
Indicator  Import  Export  EU  from EU
393  Sorting and athletic  goods  0.8  7.4  000  0.000  0.012  0.35mv..-
390  IManufacturing industries, n.e.c.  1.598  -. 31.185  0.007  0.003  - 0.377  J0.288  0.160  12.6
24Table 5
Tariff and  trade description (ISIC 4-digit)
ISIC R.2  Description  lines  Applied  Import-  Tariff  Degree of  Bound  %  exports  j%
Tariff,  weighted  dispersion  process  Rate  to  EU  imports
1999  tariff  from EU
1110  Agricultural  production  239  17.79  4.71  10.74  1.01  127.5  0.386  0.119
ii3O  Liv'estock  12  26.25  10.00  ~0.34  1.00  '27.5  0 086  0.005
i2  Fr-estry products  1036
1220  Logg-ing-  15  6.33  5.02  0.6  1.13  20  0.639  0-.825
i301  Oce"an  and coastal  fishing  ..  90  17.67  5.37  1088  1.13  30  10.671  0.799
1302  Tishing not  elswhere cl  as.sifie  I00  OO  -10  0  1.1  0.000
iij0  Z  ~  minin'g-.6  3-.00-O  3-.0-0  0o.00  O  1.00-  8.8  0.00  0.004
220  Crd  petroie'u-m  and natural  gas  6.56  16.17  0.67  1.00--  -20  06.136  02~30-
-. ii''noemi-n  -2_  3.00  3.00  0.00  1.00  21000  0.121
2302  Non-ferrous  o"re m-ining"  21  5.00  5.00  06.00  1.00  2()  00--6-6-
2901'  Stone  quarrying, clay and  sand pits  33  17.42  20.82  0.59  1.00  229  0.305  0.711
2902  Che  micai and  fer'tilizer mineral mining  17  10.29  6.00  0.87  1.12  22.9  0.131  0.223
N6  aiti mining  ... 1.67  1.67-00  1  22.9  0.228  0.914
Mi§  :ning  and q'uarrying  n'ot e'lsew-here  'classif-ied  27  80  563  0.44  1.00  22.9  10620  0 376
31  j  Sl  §aughtering, preparing  & rsrigmeat  87  26.59  8.60  . 0.93  2.56  37.8  0o  343  0 644.
3ii2  Dairy prodiu,cts  24  20.38  13.06  0.37  2.42  24.1  0.000  0.491
33 Canning, preserving of fruits  and vegetables  65  33.88  --32.44  0.i5  2.81  45  0.434  .0489
3l  Caning,  preserving  and processing of  fish  9  2.4  1098  .2  28  25.  .0  .8
35  Vegetaiblie  'an-d ani'mal oils and  fat  52  10i.44_  8.76  0.49  2.92  22.4  0.Oii  0.066
316  rin mnill  producits  34  10.59  6.13  0.73  2.29  16.1  0.027  0.281
3i7  bakeryp~roducts.13  35.12  8.85  0.34  3.00  600.013  0.947
i§iCRk2  Des,crniption.  4 lines.  Applied  Import-  Tariff  Degree of  Bound  %  exports  %
Tariff,  weighted  dispersion  process  Rate  to EU  imports
1999  tariff  from  EU
3118  Sugar fac'tories  and  'ref-ineries  15  16.8i3  9.20  0.60  2.20  123.3  0.417  0.345
319  Ccoa',chocolate a'ndsu'gar confectionery  . 13  -33  85  33.47  0.26  2 62  4  46.4  0.015  0.572
iUi  other  ioo~ p-ro-d-uc't's"34  27.35  20.47  0.24  2.82  39.8  0.027  0.673
jh  Pre-pared- ani  malI  feed's  .6666i  0,9-5
~j11  [Nistiiiiing  r'ectifying andbleni1ng spirits  1  600.00  0.00  10.00  3.00  2351  . 1.000  1.000
Wne  industries  --  .. 6  .--  ... 1---
ifi  Mait iiqu'ors  aind  mnalt..  3  420.00  782i14  1.61-  3  300  430  1000  1.0
314  Soft  drinn ks and-  carb,on-ated  waters  10  40.00  40.00  0.88  t3.00  70  0.001  107
3i40  Tobacco  ~~  ~~~~~  ~~~~~~~~~~~6  47.39  12.42  0.8  3.0  2  - .081  06.008
hi i  [piinnri-ig, weaving ad fnishingtextiles  39  41.66  31.07  0.37  11.97  23.2  0.644  10.16
322  Made'-up" textile goods excl. wearing  apparel  -66  37.50  24.99  0.26  3.00  35  0.727  10.437
13  l~Ii7n  miiis  - 54.00  54.00  0.00  2.00  38.7  0.257  039
&rptsanI-  r  .. s-  2-  3 8-.  5-2  -3  9.4 5-  0.0-9  ---- 3-.00-  60  0.244  10.184
325  Crdage, rope and twine  i  6h
32i9  Other-  'texti'les  28  2676  221  0.48  2.6  28-  0.6  0.397
5.h6  We'aring ap'parel,  except  footwear25  39.51  38.22  0.07  2.99  142  0.325  10.292
323i  TFanneries'andi leathe.r  fi-nisihing  21  . 2409  27.77  0.28  12.00  5-0  -1.
322 Frdressinganddyeingindustrics  6  - 40.00  40.00  - 00  .. 00  60  LOC00  10.000
2533  Leather prods.  exl. wearing apparel  20  30.37  30.23  10.12  3.00  145 4  p0155  0.347
4  Foo;t-wear, except  r-ub,ber or pl-ast-ic  15  40.__  400 01~8-  017  029
-. awm__s'_aigad o-e'w ood  -ls--34  21.37  8.87  0.59  2.26  .35 2  0.098  '0.502
12  NWooden  an-d  cane containers  .5  33.00  35.53  0.14  3.004  - 0.632  6.404
i9  O5therwood and cork products  8  23.13  21 74  0.35  2.88.00  010  0  464
20  Furniture and  fixtu'res, excl. metal  2-  --  3  3.8  879  03  30058.3  0.288  644
II  I  Pulp, paper, and  paperboard articles  107  19 25  15.59  0.52  1.97  236  574  0389§
'i2  Cfontainers  of  paper and  paperboard  834.38  3402  0.16  3:00  60  0.026  6  481
19§  Other pulp, paper  and paperboard articles  ..  1  28.18  29.70  0.21  2.91  23.6  0.063  0.753
'c1  Prinjiing and-  pu'blis-hi'ng  27  19.89  - 11 55  0.70  3.00  42.4  0 086  0  591
II  asc chemicals  exei. fertil;iz'ers  24  1.3  157  01  20224  0479  0.557
ij2f  Fe'rtil i  zers and  .. pestic-idecs  -27-  17.,2-2  17.7-1  0.6-6  2.19-  2-8.6  -0-  0339  0.41,  3
ii  yn  tc emsadpisi.mteil  117  12.36  8.83  0.79  1.75  29.2  0.452  0.389
-. n.  a:  s  n  aqes12  - 25.00  25.71  0.32  3.00  38.8  0.073  10  .690
:22  Drugs and medicines  64  64  .6  06  30  29  005  0.753
23  Soap,  cleaning preps., perfumes,  cosmetics  34  . 30.76  25.40  0.18  3.00  51.8  - 187  - 0780
jOtherchemicaJl  prdcs77  23.08  21.95  0.6  2.64  - 30  0.494  0.690
Petroleum  refierie  23  15.76  15.78  0.29  2.00  21.7  0.791  0.243
i46  M-isc, pet-ro-le-um  'an'd coal pro'ducts.8  13.13  14.58  0.28  2.13  23.8  10332  0  620
.51  Tyres  amnd1tues  13-30.00  30.00  0.0  3.00  39.3  ~.2  .8
~59  Ohr rubber  products  . -21.29  18.77  0.54  2.8  - 00174  0'625  - ~~66  - . - ---  ... ..  . - - _.~  ~~~~~~~~~~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  .-  . .--  -_  Li...
Pla"fi  prd't  . 29.78  26.19  0.24  p2.73  54.2  0.73
. -..it-r  . china,.ear.hnwr  14  32.68  30.55  0.26  13.00  48.1  0 717  046
GlIdass'  a'nd  -prod-ucts  - 61  27.39  25.13  0.39  ~  2.70  48.9  0.209  10.419
91  Structural clay  Products.j4  .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~24.40  116.88  0.39  2.93  31.3  0.104  IC  723
&2Cment,  lie and plaster  20.3  15.75  0.432.0  8  i  11
i9  Other non-metallic mineral  products  57  24.75  23.87  0.36  29352  0.080  ~0.667
7  10  6  iro'n and s-teelI24  15.91  14.22  0.55  2.624.5  0.311  5
1~~  k.~  bescriptio'n  imes  ~~~Applied  Import-  Tariff  Degree of  Bound  %  exports 
Tariff,  weighte-d  dispersion  process  Rate  to  EU  'imports
1999  tariff  from EU
720  N4on-ferrous  metals  154-  15.31  11.78  0.57  1.97  126.1  0.859  028
Mi  Cutlery, hiandtools and general  hardware  . 83  18.08  20.75  0.53  3.00  30.6  0.066  0.573
ml  Furniture and fixtures  primarily of metal  3  366  9.9  016  30  48  - .129  0.663
3i3  Stuctural metal products  23 - 16.01  21.70  0.68  3.049  018  065
4i§  Othier fabrIcated metal  products.133  . 25.47  26.71  0.39  2.89  40  0.2  6  0.479
321-  Engines and turbines  18  - 7.08  8.67  0.74  3.00  11.1  0.000  0.332
82  Agiutrlmcinr  n  -qimn  33  6.72  10.89  0.43  3.00  18.5  0.042  0.320
Agiulua  mc  ine  g  man  eqipment9  --  _
823  Metal  and woodl workin  mchinr  93  7.80  7.42  0.31  3.00  14.1  0.1  0.629
84  Other special  industrial machinery.138  6.80  8.37  0.75  3.00  10.9  0.093  .0.595
-~5  Office, computing  and accounting machinery  40  11.88  9.25  10.43  3.00  27.1  0.625  0.419
829  ther non-electrical machinery and equipment  194  15.42  17.14  10.95  3.02.  .6  42
- .- Eecria idutra  mahier  66.13.77  18.18  0.59  3.00  23.7  0.331  0.543
832  Ra-dio, 'te-levisio'n and communica'tio'n  e-qui'pt.  9  1'6_.79_  _1_2.24"  0-.8-0  3_.0  0-  -34-.6  0.232  6.~i
i  Electrical  appliances and housewares  25  3  2  3I501  .05.  _027  I  9
89 Oher electrical apparatus  and supplies  - -- 43  23.60  24.09  0.4  .0  34.  `0.273  0]64~
84i  Shipbuild;ing and repairing  20  14.64.  16.35  0.60  3.00  132.3  .~  I I I  0 826
84  Railroad equipment  22  659  5.34  . 0636  36  19.7  6 519  0615i
263843  Motor vdhicles  152  5657  40.99  12.44  3.00  45.7  [10.426  10.423
3844 Motorcycles  and  bicycles  . . . 22  ~~~~~~~~~~~21.29  22.50  10.43  3.00  39.2  - .43-
3845  Aircraft  20----  -- 5  .00  5.0-0-  W0.600  3.060  -12i.3  1.00  0o-  - .46
3849  O6tier tran'sportation  equipment  1  20.00  20.00  J0.00  3.00  36  1.000  0.093
3851  Prot.  'And scientific equipment n.e.c.  81  6.39  5.77  10.60  3  00  13.1  0.180  0.574
Sij  Wat'ches and  clocks  52  1.2  2.9  .3  30  4.  .~  .1
3901  Jewelery and  related articles  22h  23.33'  292  0.46  2 41  46.'i  0.15  06.25
3902'  Mustkcal  in'stru'ments  23  30.00  30.00  0.00  3.00  4.
3903  Sponting and  athletic goods  2  7.84  5.88  -0.98  3.00  28.9  0i2  !0358
3§6  M~~!anuaturin-g-i-n-dustr-ie's,  n.e.c.  102  131.18  23.02  0.36  3.00  29.8  0.377  I~
Sources:  UN Comtrade  and Egypt's official tariff schedule.
Table $
Applied  tariffs before and after reform (ISIC  4-digit)
ISIC R.2  ~Description  ~lines  Applied  Applied  %  Tariff  Political
Tariff,  Tariff  change  Eco,nomy
I1999  After  Indicator
Reform
1110  Agricultural  production  1239  117.79  13.624  0  23  N.A.
iij  uiveis-ock-...-  . - ..  2-6-.2-5  1,7-778-  0.3-2  -N.A,.
1210  Fore'stry products  19  i69  1329  0.2  NA
1220 Logg~ing  15  6.T  16jj  .66  NA.
1301  Ocean  andi coastal  fishing  90  1-7.6-7'  11.61 1  0.23  N.A.
i~~  sbing not elsm-~  clsiid20.00  :15.000  (125  N.A.
ii66  'Eoai  min,mg  ~-6  3.0  00  NA
220  Crude  petroleum  and natural  gas  86.56  5.938  0.09
iji  iron ore mining2  300  300  .0
2302  Nion-ferrous ore mm'ing  -2i1  5.00  5.000  0.00  N.A
296 I  S-t,one qu`arry-ing, clay and sand pits-33  17.42  14.167  -0.  19  liN.A.----
2902 Chem~~ical  and fertilizer mineral  mining  17  10.29  8.529  0 17  N.A.
~§6j  §ait'minin.  16.67  13.333  0.20  N.A.
290-9  Miining and quarryi-ng  not elsewhere  classifie  27'  8.06  7.778  0.04  N
Slii  §aughtering,  preparing &  preserving  meat  8  65  677  03  .8
3112  ]ai'Products  -24  20.38  15.087  0.26  1.113
3113  Canning, preserving of fruits  and vegetables  65  33.88  23.962  0.29  1.137
3j-1,  nn,peevn  and processing of fish  19  22.24  . 17.237  0.22  1.598
ji  ~  Ve'getable and  animal oils and fats52  144  863  07  060
t?6  a nm'iii'p.roducts  34--.10.,59  9.706  0.08  0.362
3117  - akery products  13  35.12  26.526  0.24  0.822
318  ugar factories andirefineries  15  ''  16.8  112.667--  10.25  .105~- 
3119  Cocoa, chocolate  and sugar confectionery  . . 13  33.85  25.000  0.26  0.971
3121  'Other food products.-  34  -27.35  18.824  0.31  . b
i  Prepared  ani-mal  feeds  2  66I833  03  .1
3i3i  -Di-sti-lling rec,tif-ying  a,nd b-lend-ing  spirits,  I  6-0000.--  3-0- 00-0  -0.9-5  . 3.0-3 0  .
312 Wine industries  7  2229.29  26.429  j099  157.732
27ISIC  R.2  Description  lines  Applied  Applied  %  Tariff  Political
Tariff,  Tariff  change  Economy
1999  After  Indicator
R  eform  ________________________
13133  Malt liquors  and malt  3420.00  23 333  0.94  10 254
3134  Sot  rinks"and  carbonated  waters'  fi  40.00  30.000  0 25  3 239
3140  ~Tobacco  - - 6  47.39  19.611  0 59  2.597
3211  i  Spinning,  weaving  and finishing  textiles  - 1394  - -41.'66  470  01i
32i2  jMade-u p.  te.xtile goods excl. wcaring apparel  166  37.50  27.361  0 27  1 128
,3213  Knitting mills  118  54.00  30.000  0 44  0.922
3214  rpets---  --  ---- 27  jgmk
-2.4..  -.-.  38.52  128.5 19  0.26  1.429
3215  Ciordage,  rope and twine  12  27.92  119.583  0.30  0.602
32i9  Other textiles
3220  We'aring  apparel, except footwear  27  39.51  29.520  0.25  0.889
3231  tanneries'and  leather  finishing  Ii-----3  -_5
3232  fur dressing and  yigidsre  6  4.0  30.000  0.25  1.739
3233  ~Leather  prods. exi.  wearing apparel  20  30.37  20.750  0.32  0 927
3240  Footw'  ear',ecxcepi,rubhber or-plas'tic"  - .5  406.00  306.00  0.25  0.71
3311  Saw m;ll-s,  -pl,ani-n,gand"ot-h,erwo-o-d-m  mills  34  21.37  - 15. 5  8-8  0-.2-7  1.2-6-8
Woen and cane containers  330  2300  00  063
3J9  i  Ot6he'r  wood and  c'ork products  8  23.13  17.500  0.24  0.503
532  furniture  an~d &itures,_  excel.  'metal  23  39.78  29.783  0 25  1  143
3i411  P-,uip,Pa'per,andpaperboardarticles  107  19.25  15.100  0.22  1.440
34i2  - Cntainersoifpaperandpaperboard-8  34.38  25.000  0.27  1.350
3419  Other pulp, paper and paperboard articles  . I  1  28.18  .1909  0.32  1.264
k4h  P rintingan~pblishing  27.19.89  1  4.831  0.25  0.872
I-.1aj  iiriase'l.feflzr  524  11.03  10 440  0.05  .0.893
3512  Fertilizers and  pesticides  27  17.22  12.593  0.27  J.0.909
k  -- SynthetiJc_r_esins  -- and, -pla"sti"c m__a,te_r_i  ais,  11-  12.3-  1-.  I-  - 8  -.- 3
32  a-i  n  t's-,  va'm'i&shsa-ndla-c'qu  ers-  12,  2_5_._00  -17.5  0-0  0_._3  0  -1.17-  3
352  rugs aMnd  edicne  66.1  6.307  0.02  0 451
3523  aop,  c  le'anin'g p r,ep,s.,  p-erf-u mes,  co's  metics  34  . 30 76  21.667  0.30  0.878
359  Other ceiaprdts77  23.08  16.438  0.29  112
.tocmreieis23  15.76  1266  0.20  0 549
3540  lMis_c.  petrole'um  and coaipout  i  -13.1  12.500  0.05  0.610
3551  TyFres  and  tubes  i3  00  000  03  2.127 
3~55  O1tir ru~bberproducts  39  21.29  15.598  0.27  1.305
j~6  Plastic'produ'cts..-1  2-9-.78  20--3  0-.  3  0  1.  19-5'
3610..  Pottery,  china, earthnware  .. 4  132.68  23.393  028  0910
3620  Glass  and products  61  127.39  19.918  0.27  1.3o4
3691  Strutural 'cla'y pro`duc-ts  214.40  1702  .30  0.85
369  Cement,  lime and plaster  206  1533  06  146
3  69-9  O_t_her  non-m etalIlic  miner,al p-  rod'uc'ts  5-7-  _24_.75 ,-_  18.29-7--  0.26  10.2
311  iron and steel  i4  15.91  2.6  0.21  0.946
iijj  Cutie'ry, hand tools and  general hardware  83  i808  1.141  0.22  1.012
3812  Furniture and fixtures primarily of metal  13j6.67  26.667  0.27  1.78
3813  Structural  -m  etal p'rod-  uc-ts  1
28ISCR2Dscription  lImes  - Applied  Applied  %  Tariff  Political
Tariff,  Tariff  change  Economy
1999  AtrIndicator
Reformn
3819  Other fabricated  metal products  133  25.47  18.340  0.28  10.969
jgi  nmes  andJ tur-bines  18  7.08  6.618  0.07  0O.389
3823  Metal and woodworking  machiner  T3  I93  . 7.80  :796  0.061
3824  Other specialindustr  iiamchinery  138  6.80  6.36~  0.04  0603  ..
3825  Offie', com  pu'ting' and' acco-un'tin g mach,in-er_y  . . 4,0  . ._1  -8  __10.563__,  -OJI1  1.95-7
~3829  Other non-electrical  machinery and equipment  194  15.42  11.946  0.23  0.973
Ele  tictri,cal  in-d-ust-rialI  m,achinery  66  137709-82
33 Raio, television and  communication  equipt.9  67  13.965  0.17  1.540
E  i  lectrical appliances  adhousewares  2  8.~T0
383  Oter electrical apparatus  and supplies  -43  2.60.  16.744  0 29  1.458
3841  Shipbuiding  and repairing  -20  14.64  12.760 - 0.13  0.821
3842  Railroad equipment  22  6.59  16.591  0.00  0 384
3843  Motor vdjiicles  ....  557  19.583  0.65  3.767
3844  Moto-rcy,cles  anrd -bicyclIes-  22  -2129  -15  9  1-3  0-.2-5-  IA  1.3 1
385  Aircraft.20.-  . --  5.000  0.00  0.389
3849  Other transportation  equipment  1  20.00  15.000  0.25  0.888  -
3851  Prof. And  scientific equipment n.e.c.  81  6.39  6.132  0.04  . . -53
3852  Photographic  'and 'optical good-s  63  18.13  13.226  0.27  1.239
Ji~j  Wat-h-  .a-d.  oks5  19.62  15.240  0.22  0.948
3901  Jiewellery  and  related articles  22  ..  2.3  17H.841  02  0.431
j§  ~  Musical  instruments  23  - 30 00  20.000  0.33  2.485
3903  Sporting and  athletic  goods  22  7.84  6.705  0.14  0.987
r§§  anulactir-ing  indus-es,.e  . c..  1-2  V  i-  22.802  0.2  1.598
Sources:  UN  Comntrade and Egypt's official tariff schedule.
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32Annex  A:  Detailed Tariff Analysis.
Egypt's tariff structure is characterized by  a high average tariff, an extremely high dispersion of
tariff levels across tariff lines, and a significant amount of tariff escalation.
In  1999, Egypt's average tariff,  including the 1 percent customs and 2-3 percent surcharge,  was
the average  level is close to 30 percent.  While generally comparable to the Moroccan and
Tunisian average tariff rates  (respectively 25 and 33.6 percent), the Egyptian rate largely
surpasses that of Argentina (13.5 percent in 1998) and Chile (11  percent).  It also compares
poorly to the  14 percent average of all IMF members.  Egypt's average import-weighted tariff is
13.8 percent, comparable to Argentina's  ( 12.9%) but higher than Chile (10.9%),  Malaysia (9.4
%) and Philippines (9.3%).  It points to the relatively  restrictiveness of the tariff structure.
Egypt's  high average nominal level is partly influenced by the excessive tariffs in alcoholic
beverages,  where tariffs can reach levels as high as 2600 percent (well above the 40 percent
upper bound of the tariff schedule). However excluding alcoholic beverages, the average tariff
remains at a high of 21.5 percent. Including the 2-3 percent surcharge, the average tariff is close
to 25 percent.
Exceptions to the maximum level of tariffs (40 percent)  occur in 353 tariff lines (6 percent of
total tariff lines).26 At a more aggregate level,  Table A. 1 reports the highest and lowest (average)
tariffs using the ISIC (revision 2) classification  (96 sectors). The lowest tariff rates can be found
in Mining, Logging and Aircrafts, whereas the highest tariff rates are in alcoholic beverages
(Wine, Distilling and blending spirits, and Malt liquors), Footwear,  Spinning Textiles, Tobacco,
Knitting mills and Motor vehicles. Note that the import-weighted tariff for these high-tariff
sectors tend to be below the simple average tariff, which gives and indication of how restrictive
these tariffs are. As shown in Table 4 below,. the simple average tariff for Tobacco is 47.39
percent, whereas the import-weighted tariff is  12.42 indicating that high levels of tariffs heavily
restrict tobacco imports.
26 Tariff levels beyond 30 percent occur in  1223 tariff lines or 20 percent of tariff lines.
33Table A.1:  Highest and Lowest tariffs
ISIC  Description  #  lines  Applied
Rev.2  Tariff,  1999
5 lowest tariffs  2100  Coal Mining  6  3.00
2301  Iron ore mining  _.2  3.00
2302  i4Non-ferrous  ore mining  21  5.00
38i5  Aircraft  20  5.00
i220  Logging  15  6.33
5 highest tariffs  3240  Footwear, except rubber or plastic  15  40.00
(excluding  alcoholic  beverages)  321  . Spinning,  weaving and finishing textiles  394  41.66
3140  - Tobacco  6.  47.39
32i3  knitting mills  18  54.00
Motor vehicles  52  56.57
Alcoholic  Beverages  3133  Malt liquors  and malt  3  420.00
3131  Distilling rectifying and blending spirits  1  600.00
3132  Wine  industries  7  2229.29
Source  Egypt  1999 tariff schedule  and DECRG calculations.
Egypt has bound over 98 percent of its tariffs line during the Uruguay Round (100% in
agriculture and 97% of its industrial tariff-lines),  with many well above the applied rates.  For 12
percent of products applied tariffs exceed the WTO bounds and are sometimes above the
Uruguay Round Base Rates (2 percent).  However, on a number of products tariffs are applied in
excess of WTO bounds (12 percent of tariff lines) and sometimes above the Uruguay Round base
rates (2 percent).  These products tend to be Chemicals, Textiles and Machinery (electrical  and
mechanical)  as shown in Table  3. No specific tariffs are present except for Tobacco.27
Table A.2:  Main items bound at levels below  applied MFN tariff rate, 1999
HS~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~f
HS  Description  No. of lines  Average  applied rate  Average  bound rate
Chapters  (Per cent)  (Per cent)
28  Inorganic chemicals  144  11.1  7.0
29  Organic  chemicals  108  11.0  7.2
52  Cotton  77  54.0  48.0
54  Man-made filaments  33  54.0  48.0
58  Special woven fabrics  37  54.0  48.0
59  Impregnated,  coated, cover/laminated  textile  fabric  10  54.0  48.0
84  Machinery and  mechanical appliances  77  10.3  5.0
85  Electrical  machinery and equipment  21  11.1  5.2
Source:  Secretariat estimates based on WTO Schedule LXIII and data provided  by the Egyptian authorities.
34I.  High Dispersion
The standard deviation of Egyptian tariffs in 1999  is 127 percentage  points, which indicates a
high degree of dispersion in its tariff structure (the coefficient of variation is equal to 4.5). Again,
this is partly influenced by the tariff peaks for alcoholic beverages;  but as shown in Table 4,
there are several other sectors where the within sector coefficient of variation is above the
traditional 0.5  level. These include Motor Vehicles, Sporting and Athletic goods, Electric
machinery  and Slaughtering.
Table A.3:  Industries with the highest and lowest tariff dispersion
iSIC  Description  #  lines  Tariff dispersion
Rev.2
Low  dispersion  1302  Fishing not elsewhere  classified  1  0.00
2ioo  Coal mining  . .6  . _.  0.00
2301  Iron ore mining  2  0.00
2302  Non-ferrous  ore mining  21  0.00
2903  . Sait mining  1i  0.00
Higb Dispersion  3111  Slaughtering, preparing &  preserving meat  87  0.93
3829  Other non-electrical  nmachinery and equipment  194  0.95
3903  Sporting and athletic goods  22  0.98  8  .
Mait  iiquors and  malt  _-__-__-i .6i
38o tor vehicles  . - 52  2.44
Source:  Egypt  1999 tariff schedule  and DECRG calculations.
Compared to similar countries in Latin America and Asia which have successfully integrated
into world markets, the degree of tariff dispersion seem to be particularly important in Egypt.
The distribution of the 1999 Egyptian tariff lines shows a large concentration  on the higher (right
end) tail.  Furthermore,  42.1 percent of the lines lie above the 25 percent tariff rate.  This is a
very different structure than the one of other similar countries such as Argentina,  where the
maximum tariff is set at 30 percent and close to 50 percent of the lines are charged between  10-
20 percent tariffs. Another 17.5  percent of the product lines are charged between 20-25 percent.
27  According to WTO (1999), Egypt Trade Policy Review.
35II.  Tariff escalation
The most salient feature of Egypt's tariff structure is the degree  of tariff escalation, i.e., tariffs
are higher for fully-processed  products whereas raw materials of semi-processed products have
lower tariffs. In 1999, the average tariff on products in the first-stage of processing is 14.3
percent; in the second stage 21.4 percent and in the third stage 35.6 percent.28
Figure 1 gives the distribution of tariffs for products on the first stage of production.  The
distribution is skewed to the left, which suggests that most of the tariffs for products in the first-
stage of processing are low. The median is at 6 percent (41 percent of tariff lines for products in
the first-stage of processing have a tariff around  6 percent). On the other hand Figure  2, gives the
distribution of tariffs for fully processed products, which is double peaked and has a median of
40 percent (23 percent of tariff lines of fully processed products have a tariff around 40
percent).29
Tariff escalation can be found across all Egyptian industries,  with the exception of Fabricated
Metal and Machinery.  Figure 3 reports the average tariffs for fully-processed, semi-processed
and first-stage of processing products  for the 9 industries of the ISIC 2-digit classification.  All
but one, have a significant degree of tariff escalation with fully processed products having a
much higher tariff than first-stage of processing products.  While not particular to specific
industries, tariff escalation is rather significant in Textile and Leather, Wood and Wooden
Furniture and Basic Metal.
28 The classification of different stages of production was calculated according to WTO filter used  in Trade Policy
Reviews.-
29 The median for the overall tariff distribution  is at 12 percent (21  percent of tariff lines).
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37Annex  B:  Variable construction and notation
The construction of the variables used in the empirical  section is discussed below. Notation to be
employed is given in parenthesis and the expected signs of the exogenous variables  is given in
square brackets.  The endogeneity problems can be important, as suggested in a study by Trefler
(1993), as most of the exogenous variables may also be functions of tariffs. Due to data
restrictions, the empirical section does not deal with endogeneity problems.
*  tariffs, the endogenous variable corresponds in all equations to the simple average tariff for
the 81  sectors of the ISIC 4-digit classification (results with import-weighted tariffs were
consistent).
*  concentration  index was calculated as: (output of the whole economy/number of firms in the
whole economy)/(output  in sector i/number of firms in sector i). [+].
*  import  penetration ratio  was calculated as: (imports )/(gross output).  [-].
a  Level ofprocessing  was calculated  as the average of the level of processing determined  by
WTO TPR at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized  system. The WTO classification gives a
value of 1 to first stage of processing goods,  a value of 2 to semi-processed  goods and a value
of 3 to fully-processed products. Given that the average is taken for the 81  sectors of the ISIC
4-digit classification, the variable becomes continuous  in the range  1-3. [2]  labor/capital
ratios  were calculated as: (number of employees)/(value  added - labor costs).
*  intra-industry  trade  was calculated as: I/[(imports-exports) 2/(imports  + exportS)2]5  [+].
*  wages per sector were calculated as: (labor cost)/(number of employees).  (noted  W).
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